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My approach to this topic is based primarily on the experience of fighting 
against apartheid in South Africa and in particular negotiations with the 
oppressor. The context is also one in which the engagement with the 
oppressor was about national liberation within South Africa. The goal of that 
liberation struggle was to overthrow white minority rule and to establish a 
democracy based on one person, one vote. Engaging the oppressor is 
something that activists did every day through acts of resistance. 
In thinking about the oppressor, activists distinguished between goals, 
strategies, and tactics. The objective of achieving a united, democratic, non-
racial South Africa was the broad goal of the liberation movement for 
decades. Its range of strategies included what it called the four pillars of 
struggle: 
1. The international isolation of South Africa. This included the boycott 
and sanctions campaigns, which served to isolate South Africa and thereby 
reduced the apartheid government’s legitimacy and support. This also 
required that the liberation movement itself gain the legitimacy of the people, 
movements, and governments of the world. 
2. The armed struggle. This was embarked upon in 1961 after the 
liberation organisations, the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan 
Africanist Congress (PAC), were declared unlawful and could no longer 
operate legally in South Africa. The armed struggle initially consisted of acts 
of sabotage but, by 1985, calls were made to render the country ungovernable 
and armed attacks against government personnel and institutions increased 
immensely.  
3. Building the undergirding structures of the ANC so that the 
organisation had a presence inside the country and could give leadership 
and direction to the day-to-day struggles that were being waged internally. 
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4. Mass mobilisation. This was the key area of emphasis from the mid 
1980s. The mobilisation of the mass of the oppressed people into 
organisations in every area of life was critical for building the capacity for 
prolonged struggle against the apartheid system. This took the form of 
establishing or strengthening trade unions, civic, youth, and women’s 
movements. Organisations amongst sports, arts, and cultural workers were 
established to ensure that these were areas of mobilisation against apartheid 
as well. Health, faith, and academia were other areas of mobilisation. In 
short, every area of struggle required mobilisation and organisation. 
In the South African struggle, and especially for the ANC and its allies, 
there was always a political purpose that guided all tactical choices, 
especially when the ANC opted to add the armed struggle to its basket of 
tactical choices. Walter Sisulu articulated this succinctly in an article written 
in prison when he wrote: 
There exists at all times a multiplicity of forms of struggle that a  
movement exploits as part of its arsenal of weapons. Any form of  
struggle, including the armed struggle, can only emerge to dominance  
over time and as a result of consistent effort. Nonetheless, even if a given  
form of struggle emerges as the dominant one, this does not mean that  
other forms do no co-exist. What it does mean in such a situation is that  
the other forms come to occupy a subsidiary place and are essentially  
reinforcing the dominant one.1 
With much of this in place, the struggle in the 1980s rendered much of 
Black South Africa ungovernable, which resulted in the state having to 
deploy its troops into the townships to enforce its rule. The government of 
the day had in effect lost any semblance of legitimacy and control over large 
parts of South Africa and could only resort to repressive measures which in 
turn fueled global pressure against it. This ultimately saw the United States 
passing legislation that supported divestment from South Africa and the 
withdrawal of major US companies from the country. South Africa’s isolation 
from the world in almost all areas of life that required global connections was 
almost complete. The cost of circumventing sanctions became too much for 
its ailing economy and this forced major South African business leaders to 
begin a process of dialogue with the banned ANC. The divisions amongst 
the oppressor bloc began to widen before engagement with the political 
component of that bloc commenced. This was crucial to the success of any 
engagement. 
This shows that engaging the oppressor depends on a number of 
variables: (1) The timing of that engagement; (2) the degree of legitimacy of 
and support for those representing each of the main contenders on behalf of 
the oppressor and the oppressed; (3) the content of such engagements; and 
(4) the implications for other forms of struggle once engagements 
commenced. 
As indicated, whether to engage the oppressor was never a matter of 
principle for the ANC. Since its inception, it had always preferred a non-
violent negotiated resolution to the South African conflict. Throughout the 
                                                          
1. See Walter Sisulu, We Shall Overcome, in REFLECTIONS IN PRISON, Cape Town: Zebra (2001).  
2






2019]        Principles, Tactics, and Negotiations with the Oppressor        33 
 
 
first fifty years of its existence, all attempts to get the white government and 
white political parties to agree to dialogue processes failed. Instead, the 
liberation organisations were banned and resorted to armed struggle to 
pursue their objectives. 
By the mid 1980s, Nelson Mandela and some within the leadership of the 
ANC as well as elements within the National Party’s intelligence service had 
separately concluded that neither the ANC nor the government was strong 
enough to defeat the other. While the government was strong militarily, it 
was growing weaker politically inside and outside of the country. Mandela 
came to the conclusion that the two sides needed to talk and started a series 
of discussions with the leadership of the National Party. At the same time, 
the ANC in exile also began a series of secret talks with the government. 
The striking thing about these talks is that they emphasised the same set 
of demands to the government. These were that talks about the future of the 
country could only commence in earnest when: (1) ANC prisoners were 
released; (2) the exiles were allowed to return unconditionally; (3) the ANC 
and other organisations were unbanned; and (4) free political activity would 
be guaranteed. 
The ANC developed a set of guidelines for any negotiations and also 
commenced work on future constitutional principles. These received global 
support from the Organization of African Unity, the United Nations, and the 
Commonwealth, amongst others. The global balance of forces changed 
dramatically in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and a growing indication 
that even the staunch supporters of the ANC, mainly the Soviet Union and 
many African countries, were of the view that the ANC needed to negotiate 
with the National Party. 
This was, however, countered with growing resistance inside the 
country. The number of labour strikes, armed attacks, and mass civil 
disobedience had reached unprecedented levels. The changing international 
environment was a major factor that pressured the ANC to start thinking 
seriously about negotiations. The backing of the Soviet Union was about to 
come to an end in 1989 and there was a very real possibility of major 
international powers taking charge of organising “peace talks,” as they had 
done in Angola and Namibia. This would have resulted in the ANC and 
those aligned with it being left out of such talks and being forced into 
agreements that would most likely have strengthened white minority rule, 
disguised as democratic change. 
A memorandum of the trade union federation in June 1989 reveals just 
how serious this threat was. The memorandum notes the following: 
The Frontline states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe,  
Zambia): The key country here is Zambia who hosts the ANC. Zambia is  
pushing for that the ANC finds a negotiated settlement as Frontline  
states can no longer provide bases to the ANC on their soil. They have  
said that if the ANC does not find a negotiated settlement, they will have  
to fight the war against apartheid within the country. The Frontline  
states have said that after there is a settlement in Namibia, they will call  
a conference and lead in the settlement of SA. [President of Zambia,  
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Kenneth] Kaunda has already indicated that he is willing to talk to FW  
De Klerk [the new president of SA].2 
This intended action resulted in the President of the ANC, Oliver Tambo, 
crisscrossing the continent and the globe gathering support for an approach 
to negotiations which ensured that South Africans would lead the 
negotiations and that the ANC’s road map for negotiations were supported. 
The outcome of this was a document called the Harare Declaration, which 
was adopted in August 1989. It received UN support in December 1989 and 
effectively ensured that there would be no external interference in the 
negotiations process which was to unfold a few months later. 
The ANC considered the road towards a negotiated settlement as being 
another terrain of struggle. It articulated its position in the following way: 
We must therefore approach these talks as a means of winning at the  
conference table or consolidating what we have won on the battlefield.  
In other words, we will enter talks as means of pursuing our political  
objectives employing other means, or to supplement our conventional  
means.3 
All these factors forced the two main protagonists to seriously start 
preparing for the eventuality of them having to engage with each other. 
The National Party government thought it would have the upper hand 
over the ANC if it released Mandela and unbanned the ANC and other 
organisations. It had hoped that it would weaken the ANC through a 
programme of building alliances with other Black organisations and leaders 
and simultaneously unleashing large scale violence in Black communities. 
A broad patriotic front of most organisations representing the oppressed 
people of South Africa was formed and endorsed the Harare Declaration and 
thus the roadmap towards negotiations. In time, however, the two main 
protagonists in the talks would be the ANC and the National Party, 
representing the oppressor and the oppressed. This, however, did not work 
and in the process of talks about talks, agreement was reached that an interim 
government was required. A national multi-party negotiating forum was 
established to prepare for a process to draw up a new constitution. An 
interim constitution was drawn up which enabled the holding of elections to 
elect public representatives to a constituent assembly who would eventually 
draw up the final constitution for South Africa. 
While all this was taking place, societal mobilisation continued and was 
escalated when the talks broke down or deadlocked. It was also a period that 
saw the highest number of political killings. Much of this was orchestrated 
by militias linked to the police and other suppressive arms of the state. 
Uncertainty about the outcome of the elections continued until the day 
of the first democratic elections in 1994. The days preceding it were marked 
by intense violence by the white right wing. April 27, 1994, however, saw 
millions of South Africans standing for hours in long queues to cast their 
historic ballots and in so doing began a programme of transition away from 
                                                          
2. Gail M. Gerhart & Clive L. Glaser, From Protest to Challenge, Volume 6: Challenge and Victory 
1980 – 1990 694, Indiana University Press (2010). 
3. A submission on the question of negotiations, Internal ANC Policy Paper (Nov. 1985). 
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apartheid rule. By 1996, South Africa adopted a new constitution which, like 
the Freedom Charter, was a massive exercise in public participation in its 
content. The preamble to that constitution is worth repeating in full to 
understand the outcome of that negotiated settlement. It reads: 
We, the people of South Africa 
Recognise the injustice of our past; 
Honour those who have suffered for justice and freedom in our land; 
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and 
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our  
diversity; 
We, therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this  
constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to – 
Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic  
values, social justice and fundamental human rights; 
Lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which  
government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally  
protected by law; 
Improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each  
person; and 
Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place  




Had the oppressed decided not to engage as a matter of principle, it is 
likely that the struggle against apartheid rule would have continued much 
longer and with the country being reduced to a wasteland before any side 
could claim victory. That would have been a hollow victory, in my view. 
Did engaging the oppressor through negotiations completely eradicate 
all the suffering experienced by the oppressed? No, it did not. But it was also 
never intended to have that end result. 
Mandela sums this up in his autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom: 
When I walked out of prison, that was my mission, to liberate the  
oppressed and the oppressor both. Some say this has now been achieved.  
But I know this is not the case. The truth is that we are not yet free, we  
have merely achieved the freedom to be free, the right not to be  
oppressed. We have not taken the final step of our journey, but the first  
step in on a longer and even more difficult road. For to be free is not  
merely to cast of one’s chains, but to live in a way that respects and  
enhances the freedoms of others. The true test of our devotion to freedom  
is just beginning.5 
In the past twenty-five years, while some progress has been made in 
eradicating the effects of centuries of oppression, much more could have 
been done. The huge racial inequality gaps that still define much of South 
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5. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom: An Autobiography of Nelson Mandela 617, 
Macdonald Purnell (1995). 
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Africa today could have been more decisively dealt with if the obsession with 
capturing the state for personal enrichment had not become the norm for the 
past ten years or so. 
The struggle to achieve the aspirations of the Freedom Charter and the 
Constitution of South Africa will, however, serve as markers for the 
magnitude of an unfinished revolution, the partial success of which was 
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